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The Future of Biotechnology Litigation
and Adjudication
GREGORY N. MANDEL*
This article pursues a difficult quarry: forecasting biotechnol-
ogy issues expected to come before courts in the future. Predicting
the future is a daunting enough challenge. Predicting the future
of litigation and adjudication perhaps borders on foolish. My ex-
perience, both as a judicial clerk and in private practice, is that
the only predictable thing about litigation is that it is unpredict-
able. Nevertheless, I believe I can provide some useful informa-
tion concerning biotechnology issues that are likely to confront
judges throughout North America and the world during the next
several years, and some insight into understanding these issues
and how to handle them.
First, I can explain what biotechnology is. Much litigation
concerning scientific and technological issues is unnecessarily
complicated by a failure to understand the science. Once the sci-
ence is understood, even at a lay level, some legal issues resolve
themselves surprisingly easily. Biotechnology is a perfect exam-
ple. Though biotechnology presents several socially and politically
highly charged issues, there actually is considerable scientific con-
sensus on this technology's scientific benefits and risks. Setting
aside the rhetoric simplifies many legal issues.
Second, I can provide a survey of past and present biotechnol-
ogy litigation. Several biotechnology lawsuits already have been
adjudicated or are being litigated, and existing litigation likely
provides some of the most reliable insight into what to expect in
the future.
Lastly, in my discussion of past and present biotechnology lit-
igation, I will ignore better judgment, and mix in predictions
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about what trends and additional issues are in store for courts in
biotechnology litigation and adjudication in the future. The arti-
cle concludes with an analysis of, and recommendations for, the
use of scientific evidence and expert testimony concerning biotech-
nology in the courtroom.
I. BIOTECHNOLOGY
The first, and most important, step in adjudicating biotech-
nology cases is to obtain a working understanding of what biotech-
nology is and is not. This part provides a primer on biotechnology
and an update on the current status of genetically modified
products.1
A. History and Science of Genetic Engineering
The history of biotechnology begins in agriculture. Geneti-
cally modified crops, in a literal sense, have been around for cen-
turies, probably since the advent of agriculture. In ancient times,
farmers saved seeds from crops that produced the highest yield,
proved the hardiest, or were the most disease resistant. Since at
least the 1500s, farmers have bred crops in an effort to produce
more durable, productive, or marketable varieties. Control over
genetic modification of crops took a leap forward in the late 1800s
with Gregor Mendel's discoveries regarding heredity and the in-
heritance of genetic traits, in particular, his finding that charac-
teristics are inherited in a predictable manner. Since these
discoveries, scientists and farmers have selectively bred closely re-
lated plants and animals in an effort to create hybrids with supe-
rior characteristics. Today, there are virtually no food products
that have not been improved in some manner by selective breed-
ing.2 Genetic modification through the breeding of plants and ani-
mals (which I will refer to as "conventional genetic modification"),
however, is labor intensive (only one out of thousands of hybrids
becomes a useful variety), can only be done among closely related
1. Part I of this article draws from Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, In-
consistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants
and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167 (2004).
2. Wild blueberries are one of the few remaining unmodified plant products. Ex-
amples of foods that have undergone particularly dramatic changes through conven-
tional genetic modification include edible ears of corn (as opposed to corn with hard
kernels that are inedible unless ground into flour), and the kiwi, which was developed
from a hard little berry.
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species, takes a long time to produce desired results (usually a
decade), and is often imprecise.
Scientists now are able to take genetic material responsible
for a particular trait in one living species (whether plant, animal,
insect, bacterium, or virus), and insert it into another species. Be-
cause the DNA building blocks for all living things are similar,
desirable genes from any living organism can be inserted into any
other living organism. This allows for modification of organisms
at the cellular level, as opposed to conventional modification via
breeding of the entire organism. If the genetic insertion is suc-
cessful, the new genetic material in the host organism does what
most genetic material does-it directs the production of specific
proteins. These proteins determine the physical traits of living or-
ganisms. This method of modification uses recombinant DNA
(rDNA) techniques, and is referred to as rDNA genetic modifica-
tion, or more generally, "biotechnology." The modified rDNA orga-
nisms are commonly referred to as "genetically modified,"
"genetically engineered," "bioengineered," or "transgenic."3
rDNA genetic engineering offers many advantages over con-
ventional breeding techniques. First, the organism being modified
does not have to be sexually compatible with the organism from
which the genetic material comes-one can take genes from bacte-
ria and implant them into plants or animals, and vice versa. Sec-
ond, new varieties can be produced much faster through rDNA
methods than through conventional breeding techniques. Third,
specific knowledge of the trait caused by the particular DNA being
transferred can reduce variability in the offspring organisms.4
Biotechnology is thus the branch of biology that concerns
technologically manipulating an organism's genetic sequence in
order to give it certain desired traits. There are three main
branches of biotechnology: medical, industrial, and agricultural.
Medical biotechnology concerns trying to cure diseases through
genetic manipulation. Some biomedical products, for instance,
help in treating particular forms of cancer by targeting and block-
ing certain proteins that are being overproduced or by blocking
3. These terms are used synonymously in this article, each referring to the direct
transfer or modification of genetic material using rDNA or other biotechnology
techniques.
4. Gregory N. Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and Overlaps: Crisis
in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2167, 2174-76 (2004). Genetic engineering, however, also can be imprecise, as dis-
cussed infra at Part I.B.2.
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the flow of blood to a tumor. Industrial biotechnology concerns
genetically modifying organisms to produce a protein or other
product that is useful in industry, such as an oil, wax, or plastic.5
Agricultural biotechnology concerns genetically modifying plants
and animals for agricultural or consumer benefit. These areas of
biotechnology can overlap. For instance, a crop modified to pro-
duce a pharmaceutical compound could be considered to fall under
any of the three categories. Because it was prepared for a confer-
ence on environmental law, this article focuses on agricultural bio-
technology, with additional discussion of other biotechnology as
well.
B. Current Status of Genetically Modified Products
Genetically modified food is already pervasive in the United
States. The first genetically modified commercial food item, the
Flavr Savr tomato (a slow-ripening tomato), was introduced in
1994.6 Since that time, genetically modified foods have become
widespread, as over sixty types of transgenic plants have been
commercialized. 7 These plants include delayed-ripening crops,
pest-resistant crops, herbicide-tolerant crops, virus-resistant
crops, bacteria-resistant crops, fungus-resistant crops, and nema-
tode-resistant crops, among others.8
Genetically modified crop production in the United States
leads the worldwide industry, accounting for over half of the
global transgenic crop. Combined, the United States, Argentina,
Canada, and China account for 90 percent of the 200 million acres
of genetically modified crop production worldwide.9 Genetically
engineered plants were grown on over 100 million acres of Ameri-
5. Id. at 2187.
6. See FDA, Ctr. for Food Safety & Applied Nutrition, Office of Food Additive
Safety, List of Completed Consultations on Bioengineered Foods (2005) [hereinafter
List of Completed Consultations], http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-Ird/biocon.html (listing
sixty-six submissions completed through May 2005); see also Information Systems for
Biotechnology, Tables for Field Test Releases and Petitions for Deregulation in the
U.S. [hereinafter Tables for Field Test Releases], http://www.isb.vt.edu/cfdocs/isbt-
ables2.cfm?tvar=4 (updated Oct. 11, 2005) (reporting that sixty-eight genetically mod-
ified plants have been deregulated).
7. See Tables for Field Test Releases, supra note 6.
8. See List of Completed Consultations, supra note 6.
9. THE PEW INITIATIVE ON FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY, FACTSHEET: GENETICALLY
MODIFIED CROPS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter FACTSHEET], available at
http://pewagbiotech.org/resources/factsheets/display.php3?FactsheetlD=2; see also
Mike Toner, Biotech Plantings Up 20%, U.S. Has Most Genetically Modified Crops,
ATL. J. CONST., Jan. 13, 2005, at 6A.
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can farmland in 2005, up from a mere 6 million acres in 1996.10 In
2005, 87 percent of soybeans, 52 percent of corn, and 79 percent of
cotton grown in the United States were grown from genetically
modified seeds; over half of the canola and papaya were geneti-
cally engineered as well.11 Estimates are that two-thirds of food
on grocery store shelves contains ingredients from genetically
modified crops, in everything from cereals and crackers, to juice
and soda, to salad dressing and sauces. 12
1. Biotechnology Wonders
Genetically modified crops are likely to become more varied
and pervasive. The first generation of crops primarily was altered
to provide agricultural benefits, such as pest resistance and herbi-
cide tolerance, increased crop yield and quality, and lower produc-
tion costs.1 3 Next-generation crops will be manipulated to create
more nutritious foods and to produce plants that grow non-food
products, such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, vitamins, and indus-
trial compounds.1 4 Numerous companies are working on produc-
ing pharmaceuticals that grow in plants. 15 Once grown, the
pharmaceuticals can be extracted from the plant, or in some in-
stances, people may be able to eat the genetically engineered plant
to obtain the benefit.' 6 In Canada, an anticoagulant agent repre-
sents the first commercialized pharmaceutical grown by a trans-
genic plant. 17 Similarly, plants may be used to grow industrial
compounds for uses such as detergent manufacturing, paper pro-
duction, and mineral recovery.18 Other flora advances include
10. NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS SERVICE, USDA, ACREAGE 24-26 (2005),
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/nassr/field/pcp-bba/acrg0605.pdf.
11. Id. at 24-25.
12. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2177. A list of crops that have been genetically modi-
fied includes: alfalfa, apple, barley, beet, broccoli, carrot, cassava, citrus, coffee, corn,
cotton, cranberry, cucumber, eggplant, grape, grapefruit, lettuce, melon, oat, onion,
papaya, pea, peanut, pear, pepper, peppermint, persimmon, pineapple, plum, potato,
radicchio, rapeseed (canola), raspberry, rice, soybean, squash, stone fruit, strawberry,
sugar beet, sugarcane, sunflower, sweet potato, tomato, walnut, watermelon, and
wheat. (Not all of these crops have been commercialized, some are still under develop-
ment.) Id. at 2177 n.20.
13. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2181-82.
14. Id. at 2178, 2186-90.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Gregory A. Jaffe, Ctr. for Sci. Pub. Int., How to Approach a Regulatory Conun-
drum (May 19, 2002), http://www.cspinet.org/biotechinabc_final.html.
18. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2178.
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trees being genetically engineered to grow faster, produce wood
that is easier to process, or resist certain diseases. 19
Research and development also is well underway for geneti-
cally modified fauna. Many laboratories are working on varieties
of genetically modified fish, such as transgenic salmon, carp, cat-
fish, trout, and shellfish, in an effort to increase rates of growth
and reproduction, improve disease resistance, enhance cold toler-
ance, or provide other benefits.20 Proposals for the commercializa-
tion of these fish are currently under review. 21
Transgenic cattle, sheep, pigs, chickens, goats, rabbits, and
rodents are being developed. Goals here include increased growth
rates, reduced fat levels, and improved disease tolerance, among
others. Experimentation is under way to genetically engineer ani-
mals to produce human biologics and other products, including or-
gans and tissues for human transplant. Animals may be modified
to produce human proteins in their milk, which could then be ex-
tracted and purified for therapeutic use in humans. 22
Even transgenic insects are being investigated. Insects do-
mesticated for farming, such as the honeybee and silkworm, are
being genetically engineered for disease resistance, and in the
silkworm's case, to produce proteins other than silk. Insects also
may be modified for improved use in programs to try to control
other pest insects or invasive plant species. There likely will be
attempts to replace or infiltrate native populations of insects with
ones that have been genetically modified to be less of a pest or
unable to transmit pathogens. Research is ongoing, for instance,
to genetically modify mosquitoes to make them malaria
resistant. 23
In sum, genetically modified crops already are widely com-
mercialized, and the commercialization of many next-generation
biotechnology products is just around the corner. Further devel-
opments in rDNA technology and genomics are expected to lead to
the accelerated development of even more new biotechnology
19. Id.
20. Other traits scientists are investigating include modification to allow marine
fish to be raised in fresh water, improving tolerance to various environmental condi-
tions, and enhancing nutritional qualities. Id. at 2178 n.25.
21. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2178. On the novelty front, an aquarium fish geneti-
cally modified to glow in the dark became the first commercialized transgenic fish. Id.
at 2178 n.26.
22. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2179. Other biologic products, such as blood and
vaccine products, may be developed in this manner as well.
23. Id. at 2189.
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products, both in number and diversity. These biotechnology-de-
rived products hold enormous promise for protecting human
health and the environment, increasing agricultural production,
improving medicine and nutrition, and providing economic
benefit.
2. Biotechnology Risks
The great promise of genetically modified products does not
come risk free. A complete survey of potential risks from trans-
genic products is beyond the scope of this article, but the catego-
ries of scientific risk are summarized in this section.24 The
scientific risks generally can be divided into two categories:
human health impacts and environmental or ecological concerns.
Beyond these scientific risks are a variety of social and ethical
concerns related to biotechnology that do not have direct human
health or environmental consequences. Examples of such con-
cerns include the potential industrialization or monopolization of
agriculture, whether the insertion of certain genes violates relig-
ious rules or dietary restrictions, whether genetic engineering in
the first instance violates ethical norms, and whether genetically
modified products should be so labeled. These normative concerns
are not analyzed in the following scientific discussion, but can
play a significant role in biotechnology litigation, as discussed in
Part II of this article.
At the outset, it is worth noting that there is no confirmed
case of human disease or illness caused by genetically modified
food. 25 There are, however, still several human health concerns
related to genetically modified food, primarily allergenicity and
toxicity. 26
Inserted genes express proteins, and certain proteins cause
allergic reactions in some people, including serious harm such as
anaphylactic shock or death.2 7 Because genetic modification
causes the expression of new proteins, a new allergen may be in-
troduced into a genetically engineered product. Scientists try to
address allergenicity concerns by evaluating whether the newly
24. For a fuller discussion of the risks of genetically modified products, see
Mandel, supra note 4, at 2190-2202.
25. Id. at 2190.
26. Id. The risk of antibiotic resistance arising from the insertion of antibiotic-
resistant genes is sometimes noted as an additional, indirect human health risk.
There is now little scientific concern regarding an increase in antibiotic resistance
from transgenic products. Id. at 2193.
27. Id. at 2190-91.
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expressed protein has a similar structure to known allergens; but
this method is not foolproof, and allergenicity is considered one of
the most difficult aspects in assessing the safety of transgenic
products.
Toxicity is a concern due to the possible introduction of new
toxins, or increases in the amounts of naturally occurring toxins,
through genetic modification. Genetic modification of food also
has the potential for unintended genetic consequences. This can
occur both because gene insertion is an inexact process and be-
cause one cannot know what pleiotropic28 or synergistic effects
may be caused by combining genes. 29
The growth of pharmaceuticals or industrial compounds in
plants raises enhanced concerns about the need for confinement
and protection of the food supply. Such transgenic plants could
get into the general food supply through multiple routes: The
crops or seeds could be misrouted during processing, pollen from a
transgenic crop could fertilize a nearby food crop, or the drug or
compound could potentially leak from the plant roots into the
soil.30
Genetically modified plants or animals may negatively impact
the environment through several mechanisms. First, newly intro-
duced genetic material may move into environments or organisms
beyond those intended. This gene flow could occur in plants
through the dispersal of genetically modified seeds; through the
dispersal of the pollen of a genetically modified plant by wind, ani-
mals, or insects; or through the nonsexual transfer of genetic ma-
terial from one organism to another, for instance, by virus or
bacteria.31 Gene flow could occur in animals through breeding,
such as an escaped transgenic fish breeding with a wild
counterpart.
A second type of environmental impact from biotechnology is
the spread of non-indigenous transgenic species into natural habi-
28. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2193-94. "Pleiotropic" effects are unintended genetic
changes that result from the inserted genetic material having an effect beyond that
intended on traits of the host organism. Id. at 2193 n.121.
29. Examples of the imprecision in genetic engineering to date include: genes for
the color red placed into petunias not only changed the petunias' color, but also de-
creased their fertility and altered their growth; and salmon genetically engineered
with a growth hormone gene not only grew too big too fast, but also turned green. In
addition, there are many examples of conventional breeding projects that have re-
sulted in hybrid offspring with traits that were unexpected based on knowledge of the
parents' genes. Id. at 2194 n.122.
30. Id. at 2199.
31. Id. at 2194.
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tats, which could cause the extinction of a wild species or other
disruption of ecosystems. 32 The introduction of transgenic plants
tolerant to extreme temperatures, soil conditions, or climates, for
example, could have impacts on other plant communities. Or, es-
caped transgenic fish could out-compete wild fish for resources
such as food, space, and mates, particularly if the transgenic fish
have been modified to improve fitness, adaptability, or survival
traits.
A third environmental concern is hazard to non-target spe-
cies. For instance, pest-protected plants may be toxic to insects
and animals other than those targeted by the introduced
pesticide.33
A common maxim stated in support of biotechnology is that it
is no different than conventional genetic modification through
breeding. As the above discussion makes clear, this statement
contains kernels of truth, but also is misleading. Although both
types of modification can lead to surprise or undesirable traits,
biotechnology poses certain different risks.34 The differences be-
tween transgenic and conventional modification risk occur pri-
marily because biotechnology allows a much broader array of
genetic traits to be incorporated into a new organism than is pos-
sible through conventional breeding. Conventional breeding is
limited by the available genetic variability in the target organism
and its sexually compatible relatives. 35 Genetic engineering
removes these limits.
The degree of change in genetic information resulting from
modification, whether conventional or biotechnological, can be
measured along two dimensions: the number of genetic changes
made and the taxonomic distance between the donor and host or-
ganisms. Changes of the former manner will vary in extent for
both biotechnological and conventional modification. Changes of
the latter manner, however, are much greater for genetic engi-
neering than for conventional hybridization. 36 Genetic engineer-
ing therefore can introduce specific traits or combinations, and
create new exposures, that conventional engineering could not.
32. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2196-97. Genetically modified herbicide-tolerant ca-
nola plants, for example, are beginning to develop into a major weed problem in some
parts of Canada. Id.
33. Id. at 2197.
34. Id. at 2252-53.
35. Id.
36. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2253.
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In summary, genetic engineering holds the prospect of spec-
tacular health, environmental, and economic benefits for society,
but these benefits do not come risk free. Because genetically mod-
ified products pose certain risks and present uncertainty with re-
spect to other concerns, it is not surprising that there has been,
and is expected to be, litigation concerning biotechnology. The
next part of this article reviews biotechnology litigation that has
occurred or is ongoing, and offers insights into additional areas
where litigation may be expected in the future.3 7
II. BIOTECHNOLOGY LITIGATION AND
ADJUDICATION-PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE
Biotechnology litigation can be divided into several broad le-
gal doctrinal categories: tort law, administrative law, nuisance,
intellectual property, genetics issues, constitutional law, and anti-
trust law. Each of these categories is discussed below, followed by




A producer is strictly liable for damages caused by its product
if the product has a defect that renders it unreasonably dangerous
and the producer knew or should have known of the danger.38 De-
sign defect claims are one of the most likely forms of biotechnology
product liability action. 39 Should any of the human health or en-
vironmental concerns created by genetically modified products be
realized or perceived to have occurred, product liability lawsuits
are expected.
Some of the most significant biotechnology litigation to date
involves product liability claims concerning the discovery of genet-
37. The discussion of biotechnology litigation in this article focuses on national
law and litigation. Various biotechnology issues also raise international issues, par-
ticularly with respect to trade. These international concerns, however, are beyond
the scope of this article.
38. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 2 (1998).
39. A design defect exists where there is another way to build the product that is
safer than the manufactured version, and the alternative is cost-effective, no more or
only slightly more expensive, and practical (i.e., it will not make the product difficult
to use or cumbersome). Id. § 2(b) (1998).
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ically engineered StarLink corn in human food. 40 StarLink corn
was not approved for human consumption because it carries
transgenic genes that express a protein containing some attrib-
utes of known human allergens; it was approved only for use as
animal feed and for non-food industrial purposes, such as ethanol
production. 41
In September 2000, StarLink corn was discovered in various
brands of taco shells and later in many other human food prod-
ucts, eventually resulting in the recall of more than 300 prod-
ucts. 42 Several of the United States' largest food producers were
forced to stop production at certain plants due to concerns about
StarLink contamination, and there was a sharp reduction in
United States corn exports.43 Grain elevators and transporters
were forced to institute expensive tests on corn shipments to as-
sure that they were not contaminated. 44
Many lawsuits were filed in connection with the StarLink
corn contamination, a number of which were consolidated in In re
StarLink Corn Products.45 In StarLink Corn, farmers alleging
contamination of their corn crops brought a cause of action
against the developer, producer, and distributor of StarLink, al-
leging design defect product liability. The farmers alleged that "as
currently designed, StarLink cannot be safely used for its in-
tended non-food purposes because it will inevitably commingle
and cross-pollinate with the food supply."46
Biotechnology product liability claims also may be based on
manufacturing defects, as where a product differs from other simi-
lar products in a dangerous manner;47 or marketing defects, such
as insufficiency in the warning or instructions that come with a
40. Mandel, supra note 4, at 2203.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2204.
43. Id. at 2204-05.
44. Id. at 2205.
45. Kramer v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc. (In re StarLink Corn), 212
F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
46. Id. at 837. Bayer CropScience's planting of genetically modified rapeseed that
contained inadvertent additional genes in Britain could have presented similar is-
sues. James Reynolds, Bayer Faces Prosecution After UK GE Crop Trials, THE ScoTs-
MAN, Oct. 14, 2003, available at http://www.gene.ch/genet2003/OctmsgOO056.html.
Bayer was conducting trials of transgenic rapeseed in England and Scotland over
three years. Id. Some of the trial seeds were discovered to inadvertently contain an-
tibiotic-resistant genes, often used to track genetic insertion. Bayer was not prose-
cuted. Id.
47. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF TORTS § 2(a) (1998).
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product.48 Certain marketing defect claims were held to be effec-
tively preempted by federal law in StarLink Corn,49 but circum-
stances where a transgenic product is improperly used as a result
of a failure to warn could form the basis for such a claim.50
Product liability claims also can sound in negligence, as op-
posed to strict liability. In StarLink Corn, the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants involved in producing and licensing StarLink
Corn were negligent in their monitoring and enforcement of the
steps required of farmers to keep StarLink Corn segregated. 51
Negligence claims could also be grounded on failure to follow regu-
latory requirements or industry standards.
Certified organic farmers in Saskatchewan, Canada com-
menced an action against Monsanto Canada and Aventis Crop-
Science (now Bayer CropScience) for the adventitious cross-
pollination of their organic canola by genetically modified canola
manufactured and sold by Monsanto and Aventis. 52 The plain-
tiffs alleged that the cross-pollination rendered the organic farm-
ers' crop no longer organic.5 3 Certain of the farmers' claims were
based on strict liability and negligence in causing the cross-
pollination.5 4
48. See id. § 2(c) (1998).
49. See In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (holding that the strict prod-
uct liability claim must be dismissed to the extent that the claim relied upon the
failure of defendants to warn plaintiffs of potential spreading of genetically modified
pollen, as such a claim is preempted by FIFRA). The court held that "plaintiffs may
proceed on the theory that defendants (1) violated duties imposed by the limited regis-
tration; (2) made representations to StarLink growers that contradicted the EPA-ap-
proved label; and (3) failed to inform parties handling StarLink corn downstream of
the EPA-approved warnings." Id. at 838.
50. See Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
In a non-biotechnology case, the plaintiffs sued McDonald's for inherently dangerous
foods on the theory that McDonald's food processing had created more dangerous food
than one would expect. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a
claim, but specifically stated in dicta that such a claim may lie for genetically modi-
fied food found to be dangerous because the danger may not be apparent. Id.
51. In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d 828. The court dismissed the negligence
claim to the extent that it relied on a failure to warn. Id. at 852; see supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
52. Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [2003] 233 Sask. R. 112.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Statement of Claim, Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [2003] 233 Sask. R.
112 (Q.B. No. 67), available at http://www.saskorganic.com/oapf/pdf/stmt-of-claim.pdf.
The negligence and strict liability causes of action were later dismissed by the court.
Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [2005] 7 W.W.R. 665. The former claim was dis-
missed because the defendants did not owe the plaintiffs a duty of care; the latter was
dismissed because there had not been an "escape" of a dangerous substance under the
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol23/iss1/4
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Product liability claims rate among the most likely biotech-
nology causes of action. They can be expected for almost any ge-
netically modified product that is alleged to cause actual damages.
This will include biotechnological medical malpractice. In one
medical biotechnology case, for instance, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendants' biotech drug impaired the plaintiffs immune sys-
tem.55 I expect you will see product liability claims alleging al-
lergenicity, toxicity, contamination, medical injury, and other
damages by biotechnology products.
2. Conversion
Conversion requires "an intentional exercise of dominion or
control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with the right
of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay
the other the full value of the chattel."56 Conversion may support
an action based on the contamination of conventional crops with
genetically modified crops.
StarLink Corn contained a conversion claim for the contami-
nation of the plaintiffs' non-StarLink crops, based on the conten-
tion that the contamination seriously interfered with the
plaintiffs' ability to sell their crops. 57 The court dismissed the con-
version claim, holding that "[tlhe crops were still viable for the
purpose for which plaintiffs would normally use them, for sale on
the open market." The court reasoned that the fact "that the mar-
ket had become less hospitable does not change the product's es-
sential character."58 Serious impairment of market value would
likely support a conversion claim in some instances.
The rarely invoked doctrine of trespass to chattels may apply
where conversion does not because the damage to the chattel is
not serious enough. Trespass to chattels requires only that the
chattel be impaired in condition, quality, or value,59 a require-
ment more easily met in many contamination cases.
Thus, future biotechnology conversion or trespass to chattels
cases may be based on the contamination of organic crops with
strict liability theory pled by plaintiffs. Id. 38-97. The court did not dismiss two
regulatory causes of action. Id. 159-94.
55. Cross v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., No. 94-382, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11804,
at *17-18 (E.D. La.).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(1) (1965).
57. In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021
(S.D. Ohio 1997).
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genetically modified ones.60 To the extent contamination substan-
tially reduces the value of the crop, or renders it unsuitable for its
intended market, a claim of conversion or trespass to chattels may
succeed.
3. Tort Litigation Issues
Class certification is expected to be routinely sought in a vari-
ety of biotechnology tort cases. Plaintiffs may seek certification of
class (and such certification may be opposed) for standard strate-
gic reasons including access to federal discovery rules, discovery
efficiency, and expense.
Class action requirements61 make certification particularly
appropriate in cases that involve market damages, such as the de-
cline in value of an entire crop or refusal of foreign markets to buy
certain crops due to genetically modified crop contamination.
StarLink Corn involved a class action along these lines.62 Future
class actions may be based on similar grounds, the contamination
of organic crops, or the refusal of certain importers to purchase
crops or crop products that may have genetically modified
components. 63
In a different vein, Sample v. Monsanto concerned plaintiffs'
attempted class certification pursuant to antitrust and conspiracy
claims. 64 The Sample plaintiffs, corn and soybean farmers, al-
leged that the defendants had "conspired to fix, raise, maintain, or
stabilize prices on genetically modified (GM) Roundup Ready soy-
bean seeds and Yieldgard corn seeds in violation of the Sherman
Act."65
60. Organic crops have been defined to exclude genetically modified crops. Na-
tional Organic Program, 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2004).
61. Certification of a class in federal court requires:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
62. See In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833.
63. The plaintiffs in Hoffman v. Monsanto attempted to obtain class certification
for all organic farmers. [2003] 233 Sask. R. 112. See supra notes 51-54 and accompa-
nying text. The court denied class certification, holding that the plaintiffs had failed
to prove that all organic farmers had been financially hurt by genetically modified
canola. Hoffman, 7 W.W.R. 665, IT 239-46, 340.
64. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 218 F.R.D. 644 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
65. Id. at 646. Although the court held that plaintiffs met the requirements for
numerosity, adequacy of representation, and commonality, they failed to show typi-
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Class actions and mass tort biotechnology litigation may raise
issues concerning manufacturer identification. Where there are
multiple producers of the product that is the subject of a suit, is-
sues of collective or joint liability arise. With genetically modified
products, however, these issues often will not be a concern be-
cause particular modifications may provide a signature allowing
the product to be traced to a specific manufacturer.
B. Administrative Law
A wide variety of causes of action are expected concerning
statutory and administrative regulations governing biotechnology.
These actions can be divided into two categories: procedural ac-
tions against a governmental agency or service for improper pro-
mulgation of regulations, and substantive actions against entities
for violating biotechnology regulations.
1. Procedural Regulatory Actions
Legal requirements for promulgating regulations vary among
governmental entities. In the United States, for example, the Ad-
ministrative Procedures Act (APA) provides certain procedures
that federal agencies must follow when enacting regulations. 66
Under the APA, federal agencies must publish all proposed new
regulations in the Federal Register at least thirty days before they
take effect, and must provide a means for interested parties to
comment, offer amendments, or object to the proposed
regulations.67
The creation of procedural requirements provides a useful
means for plaintiffs seeking to challenge agency action because
demonstration that an agency failed to engage in the appropriate
procedures satisfies the elevated arbitrary and capricious stan-
dard courts use to review agency action. 68 Thus, biotechnology ac-
tions challenging regulatory promulgation on procedural grounds
can be expected. For example, although unsuccessful, the plain-
tiffs in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, challenged the Food
cality. Id. at 649. The court held that plaintiffs had failed to show that antitrust
impact can be measured on a class-wide basis: "Plaintiffs cannot determine the but-
for marketplace necessary to establish antitrust impact" using common proof. Id. at
651.
66. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2000).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
68. See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D.D.C.
2000); 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
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and Drug Administration's (FDA's) Statement of Policy that ge-
netically modified crops would be "'generally recognized as safe'
[GRAS] ... and therefore not subject to standard requirements as
food additives" as arbitrary and capricious. 69
Other statutes create additional procedural requirements.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), for instance, re-
quires all federal agencies to consider the environmental impact of
any proposed agency action prior to taking such action, and to pre-
pare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for any proposed
action that is expected to significantly affect the environment.70
Several biotechnology actions have included NEPA claims,
and more should be expected in the future. Plaintiffs were suc-
cessful in their procedural NEPA challenge to agency action in
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler.71 The court held that
the National Institute of Health's (NIH) approval of a deliberate
release experiment involving genetically modified bacteria vio-
lated NEPA because the NIH failed to properly consider the possi-
ble environmental impact from dispersion of the bacteria.7 2 The
plaintiffs in Alliance for Bio-Integrity also brought a NEPA claim
based on the FDA's failure to prepare an EIS in connection with
their Statement of Policy. 73 However, the court, reasoning that
inaction does not require preparation of an EIS, held that the FDA
had not violated NEPA in deciding not to regulate biotechnology
crops as food additives. 74
2. Substantive Regulatory Actions
Substantive actions based upon the violation of properly
promulgated regulations can be expected in all variety of forms.
These actions may include failure to obtain proper authorization
for growing or raising genetically modified products (for instance,
certain transgenic crops require permits to grow); failure to com-
69. Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 170. The court held that the
FDA's action was not arbitrary or capricious in light of the administrative record. In
particular, the FDA did not violate the GRAS presumption because the only sub-
stances added to rDNA-engineered foods are nucleic acids and the proteins they pro-
duce, and nucleic acids and proteins are already in crops. Id. at 175-78. The case of
Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Wis. 1995) concerned a somewhat similar
challenge to an FDA decision to approve a genetically modified growth hormone for
use in cows to boost milk production. The FDA's decision was upheld here as well. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000).
71. 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 152-60.
73. Alliance for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 170.
74. Id. at 175.
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ply with permit or other regulatory requirements in the growth of
biotechnology products (for instance, growth of certain transgenic
crops requires various containment procedures); or impermissible
impacts of genetically modified products (for instance, harming an
endangered or threatened species in violation of the Endangered
Species Act). 75 The organic farmers in Hoffman v. Monsanto, for
example, stated claims for violation of various environmental reg-
ulations based on the testing and release of transgenic canola;
these regulatory causes of action were the only causes that sur-
vived dismissal.7 6
Actions for violation of statute or regulation may take surpris-
ing forms. Although not a biotechnology case, plaintiffs have suc-
cessfully used the Clean Water Act 77 to obtain an injunction
against the stocking of fish farms with certain strains of conven-
tionally bred salmon, on the basis that selective breeding of the
farmed salmon has led to genetically different fish that could have
a negative impact on wild salmon through cross-breeding between
escaped farm salmon and wild salmon. 78 This issue could arise for
bioengineered fish or other transgenic animals as well.
C. Nuisance
1. Private Nuisance
A private nuisance is a nontrespassory intentional and unrea-
sonable interference with another's use and enjoyment of his or
her land that causes significant harm.7 9 Contamination of con-
ventional crops by genetically modified crops may form the basis
of a private nuisance claim.
75. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
76. See Statement of Claim, supra note 54; Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc.,
[2005] 7 W.W.R. 665, 159-194.
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
78. U.S. Public Interest Research Group v. Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC, 257 F.
Supp. 2d 407 (D. Me. 2003). The cause of action under the Clean Water Act was
failure to obtain an NPDES permit. The plaintiffs argued that "after several genera-
tions of selective breeding, farm-bred salmon differed genetically very significantly
from wild salmon in fitness-related traits such as growth rate, age and size at sexual
maturation, and number of eggs produced." Id. at 420. As a result, "farm escapees
could have a negative genetic impact on wild salmon through cross-breeding," as the
hybrid offspring "are likely to be less fit for survival than wild offspring." Id. at 421.
The court held that "without regulation, the salmon farming operations present an
imminent threat of irreparable harm to the wild Atlantic salmon populations in
Maine," and granted an injunctive ban on the stocking of conventionally genetically
modified strains. Id. at 434.
79. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 822 (1979).
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The plaintiffs in StarLink Corn stated a private nuisance
cause of action based on the defendants' distribution of StarLink
corn seeds with the knowledge that plants grown from the seeds
would cross-pollinate nearby non-bioengineered corn crops.80 The
court held that drifting transgenic pollen could constitute an inva-
sion of land, and that contaminating crops interfered with the en-
joyment of the land.81 Similarly, the plaintiffs in Hoffman v.
Monsanto stated a nuisance cause of action based on the distribu-
tion of genetically modified canola with the knowledge that it
would cross-pollinate organic canola.8 2
2. Public Nuisance
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a
right common to the general public.8 3 To prevail in public nui-
sance, private plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have been
harmed differently from the general public.8 4
The plaintiffs in StarLink Corn stated a claim for public nui-
sance based on StarLink's general contamination of the corn food
supply.8 5 The plaintiffs contended that corn farmers, as a group,
were harmed differently from the general public due to the con-
tamination.8 6 Like the private nuisance claim, the public nui-
sance claim also survived the motion to dismiss. The court held
that the plaintiffs may be able to show that they have been
harmed differently than the general public because they "depend
80. In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
81. Id. The more difficult issue for the court concerned whether the defendants
could be liable for contamination caused by the product after its sale. The court held
that all parties who contribute substantially to a nuisance are liable, even after sale of
the product. Id. at 847.
82. Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [20031 233 Sask. R. 112. The plaintiffs
also stated a cause of action for trespass. Both the nuisance and trespass causes of
action were dismissed for failure to state a claim because the defendants only in-
vented and manufactured the genetically modified product, but were not responsible
for its release. Hoffman v. Monsanto Canada, Inc., [2005] 7 W.W.R. 665, 98-133.
A trespass action would be unlikely to succeed under United States law as well, due to
the nominal nature of the trespass of pollen.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1979).
84. Id.
85. In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 844-45, 848. The public nuisance
claim was thus premised on contamination of the general corn food supply, while the
private nuisance claim was premised on cross-pollination of the farmers' fields. The
court stated that a private nuisance claim could not be supported by contamination of
the general food supply as "[clommingling could not constitute a private nuisance be-
cause it does not involve an invasion of any private interests in land." Id. at 845 n.12.
86. Id. at 848.
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on the integrity of the corn supply for their livelihood."8 7 Thus,




Most genetically modified products are covered by patent pro-
tection, so patent validity and infringement issues represent a
large area of biotechnology litigation.88 Traditional patent valid-
ity issues and litigation generally do not raise new legal issues as
a result of involving biotechnology inventions.8 9 A couple of new
wrinkles do arise, and are discussed below.
Crops grown from genetically modified seed will produce ge-
netically modified seed-the modification is passed from the crop
to its progeny seed. This presents a problem for biotechnology
companies seeking to maximize their profits: Having purchased
genetically modified seeds, the grower can raise the crops, harvest
the seeds, and never have to purchase the product again. Produc-
ers of genetically modified seeds combat this problem by usually
only selling their patented seeds pursuant to licensing agreements
that contractually prohibit growers from harvesting seeds pro-
duced by the transgenic crops after they are grown. 90
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Plant Genetic Sys. v. Dekalb Genetic Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (holding patent on genetically modified herbicide-resistant plants not infringed
because the cell patent claims were invalid for lack of enablement); Monsanto Co. v.
Bayer Bioscience N.V., 363 F.3d 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (reversing district court's hold-
ing that four patents for transgenic pest-protected corn were invalid because of ineq-
uitable conduct during prosecution of the parent application, and remanding for
further proceedings); Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that challenged biotechnology patents for the production of
erythroprotein were effective); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (holding that patents on particular monoclonal antibodies that bind to a
human breast cancer antigen were invalid because Chiron did not adequately disclose
or support the subject matter of its patents); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding patent on methods of selectively inhibiting
certain enzyme activity invalid for failure to identify a required compound).
89. Patenting of biotechnology subject matter does raise certain nuanced patent
validity issues, but these issues are beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., In re
Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (creating an arguably different non-obvious stan-
dard for patent validity for biotechnology inventions); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (creating an arguably different written
description requirement for patent validity of biotechnology inventions).
90. See infra note 91.
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A number of lawsuits, in both the United States and Canada,
have been brought by genetically modified seed producers against
growers for harvesting genetically modified seeds or growing ge-
netically modified plants in violation of the licensing agreements.
These actions are based on patent infringement claims, as growers
who violate their license agreement do not have a license to plant
the patented seeds that they are using, and thus are using a pat-
ented product without permission. Genetically modified seed pro-
ducers have routinely won these patent infringement cases. 91
A second patent law twist concerns "biopiracy." Biopiracy is
the "unauthorized and uncompensated expropriation of tradi-
tional knowledge and resources"92-for instance, expropriating
native knowledge that a certain plant has medicinal qualities.
Several developing countries, including India, the Philippines,
and Brazil, have implemented intellectual property or similar le-
gal protection for genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 93
In general, these laws require entities seeking to patent inven-
tions based on genetic resources or traditional knowledge to com-
pensate claimants or the country itself.94 The Convention on
91. See Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding farm
operator liable for patent infringement for violating technology license, and denying
farm operator's claim that the technology license was invalid for patent misuse); Mon-
santo Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (granting Monsanto a reasonable
royalty for the patent infringement where defendant saved seeds containing patented
Roundup-Ready biotechnology for use the next year); Monsanto Co. v. Swann, 308 F.
Supp. 2d 937 (2003) (finding use of harvested glyphosate herbicide-resistant seeds in
violation of license to be an infringement of Monsanto's patent rights); Monsanto Co.
v. Hartkamp, No. 00-164-P, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25253 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2001)
(finding infringement on Monsanto's patent rights by planting Roundup-Ready soy-
beans in violation of license); Monsanto Co. v. Roman, No. 1:03-CV-068-C, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10724 (N.D. Tex. May 17, 2004) (granting Monsanto's motions for partial
summary judgment and injunctive relief based on defendant's act of saving Mon-
santo's patented seeds and planting the next year); Monsanto Canada Inc. v.
Schmeiser, 2004 S.C.C.D. LEXIS 48 (finding that Schmeiser knew or should have
known that he saved and planted seed containing the patented gene and cell and sold
the resulting crops).
92. Michael Woods, Food for Thought: The Biopiracy of Jasmine and Basmati
Rice, 13 ALB. L.J. Sc. & TECH. 123, 134 (2002) (quoting Valentina Tejera, Note, Trip-
ping Over Property Rights, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 967, 971-72 (1999)).
93. Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional Knowl-
edge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 371, 380-81
(2004).
94. See, e.g., id. See also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agree-
ment and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 6, 31-33 (2004); Woods, supra note 92; Lakshmi Sarma, Biopiracy: Twen-
tieth Century Imperialism in the Form of International Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 107 (1999); Timothy P. Daniels, Keep the License Agreements Coming: The
Effects of J.E.M. Ag Supply, Incorporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorpo-
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Biodiversity, which the United States has not ratified or ap-
proved, provides some international protection for genetic re-
sources. 95 For instance, commercially successful use of a
developing country's genetic resources can require compensa-
tion.96 Most developed countries, however, do not provide enforce-
able protection of indigenous knowledge or genetic natural
resources.
2. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
An ongoing debate concerns whether genetically modified or-
ganisms should be eligible for patent protection at all. This de-
bate pits those who argue that bioengineered organisms are
inventions worthy of patent protection against those who contend
that the patenting of living organisms violates ethical or moral
standards.
This question was settled legally in the United States a quar-
ter century ago, without much public debate, when the Supreme
Court held in Diamond v. Chakrabarty that genetically modified
bacteria were patent eligible.97 Since that time, numerous pat-
ents have been granted on various genetically modified life
forms.98 Isolated and purified genes also are patent eligible in the
United States. This includes isolated and purified human genes,
although claims "encompassing a human organism" may not be
granted based on an appropriations restriction. 99
Other countries have not answered this question quite as sim-
ply. The Canadian Supreme Court, for example, recently held
that the "onco-mouse"-a mouse genetically modified to be partic-
ularly susceptible to breast cancer and therefore useful in re-
rated on Universities' Use of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Their Plant Genetic
Research, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 771 (2003).
95. See Helfer, supra note 94, at 28-32; Convention on Biological Diversity, Par-
ties Information, http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
96. See Helfer, supra note 94, at 31.
97. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
98. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed June 22, 1984) (issued Apr. 12. 1988)
(transgenic non-human mammals, based on the Harvard Onco-Mouse, a mouse genet-
ically modified to be highly susceptible to cancer); U.S. Patent No. 5,175,383 (filed
Feb. 17, 1989) (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (genetically modified mouse); U.S. Patent No.
5,175,385 (filed Sept. 3, 1987) (issued Dec. 29, 1992) (genetically modified virus-resis-
tant mouse).
99. Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act
of 2006, § 623, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290, 2342.
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search-was not patent eligible.100  The Court held that
genetically modified higher life forms (such as animals) are not
patent-eligible inventions. 10 1 Genetically modified microorga-
nisms are, however, patent eligible in Canada.10 2
A closely related debate arises over the propriety of cloning.
To date, however, few countries have acted to ban cloning.
E. Genetics Issues
1. Genetic Property Rights
Some unusual biotechnology cases concern whether or to
what extent a person owns property rights in his or her genes or
genetic characteristics. These cases arise when a researcher has
used organs, tissue, or other genetic or DNA samples from a per-
son to achieve some medical breakthrough. The cases concern
whether the individual whose genetic material was used possesses
any property right or other interest in the invention.
Two primary American cases illustrate this issue. In Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, Moore's spleen was re-
moved for medically indicated reasons. 1 0 3 Extracted cells from the
spleen were used in medical biotechnology experiments, possibly
without his knowledge or consent, and a resulting cell-line was
patented. 10 4 Moore claimed an interest in the patent and cell-line,
and brought suit against the patent owner.10 5 The California Su-
preme Court held that Moore did not have a property interest in
his cell-line sufficient to support a claim for conversion. 10 6 In
100. Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm'r of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45, 2002 SCC
76, available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/2002/vol4/html/
2002scr4_0045.html.
101. Id. The Court held that genetically modified higher life forms are not a "man-
ufacture" or "composition of matter" within the meaning of "invention" in the Cana-
dian Patent Act. Id. at 160-61. The debate over the patent eligibility of genetically
modified organisms has followed a particularly long and twisting path in Europe,
with most countries now allowing such patenting.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481 (Cal. 1990). This case
received significant publicity, in part for the $3 billion value attached to Moore's cell-
line in the complaint. This case, however, was decided on appeal from a granted de-
murrer; as such, the facts were assumed to be those stated in the complaint. In real-
ity, the cell-line was never commercialized.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 487.
106. Id. The court reasoned, "First, a fair balancing of the relevant policy consider-
ations counsels against extending the tort. Second, problems in this area are better
suited to legislative resolution. Third, the tort of conversion is not necessary to protect
patients' rights." Id. at 493. The court did uphold Moore's separate cause of action for
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reaching this decision, the court explicitly identified the strong
policy reasons of limiting civil liability for innocent parties en-
gaged in socially useful activities by noting that "the extension of
conversion law into this area will hinder research by restricting
access to the necessary raw materials."10
7
In Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institute,
Inc. the plaintiffs included individuals with Canavan's disease
and their family members.108 The plaintiffs approached a doctor
to persuade him to research a cure for Canavan's disease and pro-
vided genetic samples and financial support to further the re-
search.' 0 9 The doctor successfully isolated and patented the gene
responsible for Canavan's disease.1'0 Miami Children's Hospital,
assignee of the patent, decided to limit Canavan disease testing
through restrictive licensing under the patent.1 1' The plaintiffs
brought suit, seeking a property right or other interest in the pat-
ent and discovery.11 2 As in Moore, the court held that the plain-
tiffs had no property interest in their donated body tissue or
genetic information, which had been voluntarily provided." 3 The
Greenberg court also noted concerns that creating an interest for
donors could potentially cripple medical research. 11 4
2. Genetic Identification
Advances in genetic identification and recognition raise a di-
verse array of new legal issues. These issues can only be briefly
surveyed here. A primary concern is the potential for genetic dis-
crimination, for instance by health insurance companies against
individuals with genes that place them at higher risk for certain
diseases. 115 Genetic discrimination is also a concern in other con-
breach of informed consent. Id. at 483, 487. The case settled before this issue was
further litigated.
107. Id. at 494.
108. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
1064, 1066 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1067.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1068.
113. Id. at 1074-75. Plaintiffs' claim for unjust enrichment did survive the motion
to dismiss. Id. at 1072. This case settled as well, with Miami Children's Hospital
allowing the gene to be used for further research.
114. Id. at 1076.
115. See Deborah Hellman, What Makes Genetic Discrimination Exceptional?, 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2002); Jennifer S. Geetter, Coding for Change: The Power of the
Human Genome to Transform the American Health Insurance System, 28 AM. J.L. &
MED. 1 (2004).
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texts, such as employment, life and disability insurance, or child
custody and adoption decisions. 116 Most states have enacted legis-
lation prohibiting genetic discrimination in providing health
insurance.117
Many states have passed laws requiring the submission of a
DNA sample by individuals accused, indicted, or convicted of cer-
tain crimes." 8 These laws have been challenged, unsuccessfully,
as unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amend-
ment,11 9 violations of the Equal Protection Clause,120 violations of
the prohibition against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment,1 21 deprivation of property rights without due process or just
116. Hellman, supra note 115, at 77.
117. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic and Health Insurance:
State Anti-Discrimination Laws, http:www.ncsl.org/programs/healthlgenetics/
ndishlth.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 2005) (showing that forty-three of the fifty states
have enacted laws prohibiting genetic discrimination in health insurance). See also
William F. Mulholand & Ami Jaeger, Genetic Privacy and Discrimination: A Survey of
State Legislation, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 317 (1999) (describing state anti-discrimination
legislation). A federal anti-genetic discrimination bill passed the Senate in 2003, but
was not enacted. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2003, S. 1053,
108th Cong. (2003).
118. Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding
the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127 (2001).
119. See, e.g., Gaines v. Nevada, 998 P.2d 166, 172 (Nev. 2000). In Gaines, an indi-
vidual convicted of non-violent crimes challenged a requirement to submit a DNA
specimen as an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
court applied a balancing test and found that the state's interest in solving crimes
outweighed the convict's expectations of privacy and the intrusive nature of the blood
draw; thus, the Fourth Amendment was not violated. Id. at 172. See also Nicholas v.
Goord, 2004 Dist. LEXIS 11708 (S.D.N.Y.) (analyzing a New York statute authorizing
genetic testing of convicts under a Fourth Amendment balancing test and finding that
the statute's primary purpose was to solve crimes, and therefore outweighed the con-
vict's privacy interests); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004) (look-
ing at the totality of the circumstances to determine that a California law requiring
prisoners to submit to DNA testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
120. See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999). In Marcotte, the plain-
tiffs unsuccessfully argued
that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause because it (1) imper-
missibly distinguishes between individuals convicted of crimes character-
ized as sexual offenses and those convicted of other violent offenses, (2)
targets incarcerated sex offenders but not prior sex offenders who cur-
rently reside in the community, and (3) targets convicted sex offenders
whether or not their current incarceration is for a sex offense.
Id. at 82.
121. See, e.g., Boiling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the DNA databank statute did not violate plaintiffs Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination because DNA evidence is not testimonial in nature).
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compensation under the Takings Clause, 122 ex post facto laws, 123
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, 124
and even on separation of powers grounds. 125 Intertwined in both
the discrimination and DNA sampling debates is the heavily con-
tested issue of whether and what genetic privacy rights exist.126
More imaginative genetics claims have been litigated as well.
A woman who developed colon cancer sued her father's physician
for negligently failing to warn her of the genetic nature of her fa-
ther's colorectal cancer. 127 The daughter claimed that if she had
been warned, she would have undergone testing for early detec-
tion of her disease, and would not have required as extensive sur-
gical treatment. 128 The court held the doctor liable for failure to
warn "those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a geneti-
cally transmissible condition."1 29 The court reasoned that the ge-
netic threat was foreseeable and the group at risk was easily
identifiable. 130 Similarly, a physician was held to have breached
his duty of care for failing to perform genetic testing of the parent
of a patient with Fragile X Syndrome, a disorder with a high
probability of genetic transmission, in order to diagnose the disor-
der.131 These examples indicate that genetics litigation is likely to
continue in the future.
122. See, e.g., id. (holding that the Colorado statute compelling inmates to submit
to DNA testing does not implicate a liberty interest protected by due process or a
property interest).
123. See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Because [the
statute's] obvious purpose is to create a DNA data bank to assist in the identification,
arrest, and prosecution of criminals, not to punish convicted murderers and sexual
offenders, it does not violate the prohibition against ex post facto punishment.").
124. See, e.g., Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588 (D. Minn. 1994) (holding
that taking blood did not amount to "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"
under the Eighth Amendment because of the legitimate interest of constructing a
DNA database of criminal sex offenders).
125. See, e.g., Dial v. Vaugh, 733 A.2d 1, 4-6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (holding that
the DNA databank statute of Pennsylvania did not violate separation of powers re-
quirements because it did not affect appellant's eligibility for parole or alter his sen-
tence length).
126. See Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper
Understanding of Genetic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 762, 776 (2004) (argu-
ing that "genetic privacy . . .protects personhood interests in shielding us against
stigmatization, discrimination, and being misunderstood.").
127. Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
128. Id. at 1190.
129. Id. at 1192.
130. Id.
131. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 719-20 (Minn. 2004).
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F. Constitutional Law
Certain biotechnology cases implicate constitutional concerns.
International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy involved an in-
dustry challenge to a Vermont statute that required the place-
ment of a blue dot on products that contained milk from cows
treated with a genetically modified growth hormone (known as
rBGH) designed to boost milk production. 132 Certain dairy manu-
facturers and food retailers challenged the labeling requirement
as a violation of their First Amendment right not to speak. 133 The
Second Circuit concurred, holding that because neither consumers
nor scientists could distinguish between milk from a cow treated
with rBGH and milk from an untreated cow, the manufacturers
and retailers could not be required to speak against their will.134
Conversely, in Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, the
plaintiffs sued Illinois on First Amendment speech grounds for
preventing the plaintiffs from labeling their goods as not contain-
ing rBGH. 135 The case settled when Illinois allowed the voluntary
labeling of non-rBGH food products, and the parties reached a
compromise on the language to be used on the labels. 136
132. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996). In accordance
with FDA requirements, the Vermont regulations required a posting of a disclaimer
that "'the [FDA] has determined that there is no significant difference between milk
from treated and untreated cows.'" Id. at 70 (quoting Adopted Rules (rBST Notifica-
tion and Labeling Regulations Relating to Milk and Milk Products) of Vermont Dep't
of Agriculture, Food and Markets § 3.1b).
133. See Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67.
134. Id. The court held that consumer curiosity alone (the only interest that Ver-
mont argued) was not a strong enough state interest to compel even an accurate fac-
tual statement. Id. at 74. In a similar action, Monsanto sued a large Maine dairy to
challenge a voluntary program Maine used to certify in-state producers who did not
use rBGH on the grounds that such labeling constituted misleading advertising and
imposed unlawful restrictions on market access. Complaint for an Injunction, Mon-
santo Co. v. Oakhurst Dairy Inc., No. 03-11273RCL (D. Mass. filed July 3, 2003). This
suit was settled when Oakhurst Dairy agreed to add a disclaimer to its label which
read: "FDA States: No significant difference in milk from cows treated with artificial
growth hormones." See Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/
Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REV. 525,
574 n.210 (2005) (citing Edward D. Murphy, Oakhurst to Alter Its Label, PORTLAND
PREss HERALD, Dec. 25, 2003, at Al).
135. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. v. Lumpkin, No. 96 C 2748, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12469, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 1996).
136. Ben & Jerry's, State in Accord on Growth Hormone Statement, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 14, 1997, at 4. Under the agreement, Ben & Jerry's products may say:
We oppose Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone. The family farmers
who supply our milk and cream pledge not to treat their cows with rBGH.
The FDA (Food and Drug Administration) has said no significant differ-
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In Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, the plaintiffs chal-
lenged the FDA's decision not to require labeling of genetically
modified products as a violation of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act. 137 The plaintiffs argued that without labels, individuals
with religious dietary restrictions would not be able to follow their
restrictions because they would not know whether a gene from an
unacceptable animal (e.g., a pig for certain religions) may have
been inserted into an otherwise acceptable food. 138 The court held
that the lack of a labeling requirement did not substantially bur-
den plaintiffs' practice of their religions because the FDA action
did not require anyone to abandon their religious beliefs or
practices. 139
G. Antitrust Law
Although there has not yet been much biotechnology litiga-
tion in the area of antitrust law, courts will likely see many anti-
trust actions related to biotechnology in the future. Most
genetically modified products are subject to patent or other intel-
lectual property protection that confers a legal monopoly on the
owner. As a result, allegations of illegal monopoly and of exercise
of illegal monopoly power are particularly likely.
At least a few biotechnology antitrust actions have been filed
to date. Sample v. Monsanto concerned plaintiff corn and soybean
farmers who alleged that the defendants had "conspired to fix,
raise, maintain, or stabilize prices on genetically modified (GM)
Roundup Ready soybean seeds and Yieldgard corn seeds in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act."140 In Monsanto v. McFarling, the de-
fendants raised an affirmative defense that the technology license
McFarling had signed (and violated) was invalid because Mon-
santo had committed patent misuse, and consequentially anti-
trust violations, by tying rights to use offspring of transgenic
seeds to the patented parent seeds.1 41 Both actions were
unsuccessful.
The intersection of intellectual property rights and antitrust
violation represents a complex area of law beyond the scope of this
ence has been shown and no test can now distinguish between milk from
rBGH-treated and untreated cows.
Id.
137. Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 180 (D.D.C. 2000).
138. Id. at 181.
139. Id.
140. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 218 F.R.D. 644, 646 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
141. Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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article. In general, however, the antitrust issues raised concern-
ing biotechnology should be unaffected by the fact that monopoly
power is being challenged with regard to a biotechnology product.
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY ON BIOTECHNOLOGY
Scientific expert testimony will play a significant role in much
biotechnology litigation and adjudication. Because certain bio-
technology issues concern matters at the forefront of scientific
knowledge and present significant scientific uncertainty, use of
expert evidence in this area will be particularly challenging for
judges. It has been, and likely often will be, the case that the par-
ties produce well-qualified scientific experts and proffer scientific
evidence that is diametrically opposed. In this situation, it is im-
portant for courts to sift through the evidence to try to get as good
a handle as possible on what the actual level of scientific under-
standing is.
There are several factors to consider when contemplating the
use of expert testimony in biotechnology litigation and adjudica-
tion. The first is to explicitly recognize what is already known-
neither side's expert may be promoting the current best state of
scientific knowledge. Rather, each side is presenting evidence
that best supports its case-which may be partially correct, and
partially a stretch. Best current scientific understanding is often
a third body of knowledge that neither side introduces into evi-
dence because it does not make their case as cleanly as desired. In
this regard, one study found that four out of five judges do not
believe that party expert witnesses can be counted on to be
impartial. 142
Thus, judges should often exercise their discretion in biotech-
nology cases to acquire and admit independent, non-party expert
evidence. This will usually give the decision-maker the least-bi-
ased view of the state of scientific knowledge, and allow them to
focus on the true legal dispute and scientific issues in contention
in order to achieve the most just result possible.
The primary means to achieve this goal is the use of court-
appointed experts. Court-appointed experts offer many advan-
tages. They can highlight the (often considerable) areas of scien-
tific agreement and consensus. The litigation can then
concentrate on the narrower contentious issues. In addition, a
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court-appointed expert is less likely to act as an advocate, and
more likely to act in the ideal expert witness role-as an educator.
Lastly, cross-examination will focus more on the scientific ques-
tions at issue, rather than arguments about competence and
integrity.
Most judges have the authority to appoint experts on their
own, but this authority is rarely invoked. 143 This mechanism may
be seldom used for several reasons: Judges do not want to inter-
fere in what is viewed as the parties' prerogative, are not necessa-
rily confident they would select the most appropriate expert, and
are reluctant to do so out of concern that the selection of a court-
appointed expert may be outcome determinative.
With regard to the first two concerns, judicial selection of an
impartial expert will vastly increase the potential for the court to
reach the "correct" and just decision in a case, even if the expert is
not the absolutely best that could have been found. As discussed,
party selection often leads to two polarized partial views, without
sufficient regard to the actual state of scientific knowledge.
Finding an appropriate court-appointed expert is a challenge,
but judges have several means at their disposal. First, they can
require the parties to submit lists of appropriate experts and look
for matches. Often biotechnology litigation may involve such par-
ticular issues that it may not take many recommendations before
both parties suggest the same name. This method has been used
with success in the past. 4 4 Second, the court could ask the ex-
perts selected by each side to recommend additional experts.
Often there will be mutually respected scientists in the field.
Third, the court could contact scientists in related fields to ask for
recommendations. Similarly, the court could contact legal aca-
demics in the relevant area, who often will be able to recommend
well-respected scientists in the field.
As to the final concern, court-appointment of an expert need
not be outcome determinative. The parties may be allowed to in-
troduce their own experts as well. Should the court-appointed ex-
pert err, the court will have an opportunity to hear corrective
testimony. Court appointment of experts still leaves substantial
143. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 706 (allowing for the appointment of expert witnesses
on motion of the court). In other jurisdictions, courts have the inherent authority to
appoint expert witnesses on their own. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 730 (West 2005);
Kesseler v. Kesseler, 180 N.E.2d 402, 407 (N.Y. 1962).
144. See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Boehringer Manheim GmbH, 989 F. Supp. 359 (D.
Mass. 1997).
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control in the hands of the decision-maker, whether judge or jury.
In rare cases where the court-appointed expert's testimony is out-
come determinative, the science will have dictated such a result.
This system thus achieves a balanced consideration of science, as
opposed to a system that pushes a disregard for science.
When many biotechnology issues are investigated, a surpris-
ing degree of scientific consensus emerges. Use of court-appointed
experts allows this consensus to be considered by the court and
greatly increases the chances for a decision that properly accords
with scientific understanding.
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